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Abstract
Several easy to understand and computationally tractable imprecise
probability models, like the Pari-Mutuel model, are derived from a given
probability measure P0. In this paper we investigate a family of such mod-
els, called Nearly-Linear (NL). They generalise a number of well-known
models, while preserving a simple mathematical structure. In fact, they
are linear affine transformations of P0 as long as the transformation re-
turns a value in [0, 1]. We study the properties of NL measures that are
(at least) capacities, and show that they can be partitioned into three
major subfamilies. We investigate their consistency, which ranges from
2-coherence, the minimal condition satisfied by all, to coherence, and the
kind of beliefs they can represent. There is a variety of different situations
that NL models can incorporate, from generalisations of the Pari-Mutuel
model, the ε-contamination model and other models to conflicting atti-
tudes of an agent towards low/high P0-probability events (both prudential
and imprudent at the same time), or to symmetry judgments. The consis-
tency properties vary with the beliefs represented, but not strictly: some
conflicting and partly irrational moods may be compatible with coherence.
In a final part, we compare NL models with their closest, but only partly
overlapping, models, neo-additive capacities and probability intervals.
Keywords. Nearly-Linear models, Pari-Mutuel model, 2-coherent impre-
cise probabilities, coherent imprecise probabilities, probability intervals
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1 Introduction
A great number of different models is nowadays available to represent uncer-
tainty and imprecision in real-world knowledge. They range from very general
ones like lower and upper previsions to special cases like probability intervals,
p-boxes, possibility/necessity measures, and others. When it is reasonable to
adopt it, the advantage of a special model is that it is a simplified and easier to
understand uncertainty representation.
In this paper, we introduce and investigate a family of such simplified models,
to be called Nearly-Linear (NL) models. Formally, NL models are neighbourhood
models (cf. [1, Chapter 4.7]), being obtained from a given probability measure
P0. The probability P0 may represent an assessor’s first approach evaluation, or
a ‘true’ probability that has to be modified for some reason. For instance, P0(A)
is not a bookmaker’s realistic selling price1 for an event A: being a fair price,
it does not ensure a positive gain in the long run, nor does it incorporate the
bookmaker’s costs and commissions. Thus, in the Pari-Mutuel model, a well-
known neighbourhood model born in the world of horse betting [12, 17, 20],
P0(A) is replaced by the upper probability PPMM(A) = min{(1 + δ)P0(A), 1},
δ > 0, as a more credible selling price for A. Note however that PPMM(A) ↓ 0
as P0(A) ↓ 0, which again might not correspond to reality: a bookie may stand
some fixed cost c > 0, irrespective of how unlikely A is. If (1 + δ)P0(A) is
smaller than c, after deducting all costs c the bookmaker’s net gain from selling
A for PPMM(A) is negative, no matter whether A occurs or not. This problem
is solved by the NL model, generalising the Pari-Mutuel model, studied in the
later Section 4.
The idea behind the definition of NL models is rather simple: µ is a NL
uncertainty measure if it is a linear affine transformation of P0, as long as this
makes sense, i.e., as long as µ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
µ(A) = bP0(A) + a, if bP0(A) + a ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
The main goals of our investigation of the NL models are:
1When the bookmaker sells event A, s/he then pays to the buyer 1 if A occurs, 0 otherwise.
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(a) Determine the general properties of NL models and classify them into
exhaustive families of submodels.
(b) Detect the consistency properties of each submodel.
(c) Establish which beliefs they may elicit.
(d) Compare the NL models with their closest uncertainty models.
In detail, after recalling some essential preliminary notions in Section 2, item (a)
is tackled in Section 3. After observing that requiring b > 0 in (1) guarantees
that µ (defined precisely by the later Equation (8)) is a capacity, we prove that
NL models are closed with respect to conjugacy (Proposition 3.1). Thus every
NL model corresponds to a couple of conjugate capacities; by establishing a
condition for a lower probability P in a NL model to be 2-coherent, Propositions
3.2 and 3.3 let us interpret this couple as a lower and an upper probability.
From these results, and taking the Pari-Mutuel model as a starting point, NL
models can be partitioned into three submodels. The first, the Vertical Barrier
Model (VBM) studied in Section 4, is always coherent and extends various well-
known models, including the Pari-Mutuel model, the ε-contamination model,
and the vacuous imprecise probability. In Section 5 we investigate the Horizontal
Barrier Model (HBM). It is always 2-coherent, and may express an assessor’s
conflicting attitude (prudential towards some events, imprudent towards other
ones). Perhaps surprisingly, this may be compatible with coherence too, under
additional conditions. We prove in Proposition 5.5 that the upper probability
in this model is coherent if and only if it is subadditive, and in Section 5.2
we detail the rather restrictive conditions imposed by subadditivity. Some of
these models may even be precise probabilities, as discussed in Section 5.3.
Section 6.1 studies the third NL model, the Restricted Range Model. It does
not generalise the Pari-Mutuel model, may still elicit conflicting moods for an
assessor, is always 2-coherent, but coherent only in marginal situations. In
Section 6.2 we explore items (a), (b) and (c) for a degenerate NL model, the
Hurwicz capacity corresponding to b = 0 in (1). Item (d) is addressed in Section
7: preliminarily, we study in Section 7.1 how properties of the sets of events of
µ-measure 0 and 1 depend on the kind of consistency of µ. This analysis is useful
to compare, in Section 7.2, NL models with neo-additive capacities, introduced
in [2] in a decision theoretical framework. Although making use of (1) too, neo-
additive capacities require additional (and, in our opinion, overly restrictive)
constraints on the sets of µ-measure 0 and 1. These constraints, among other
issues, differentiate them from NL models. A parallel between NL models and
probability intervals is also of interest, given that the Pari-Mutuel model is,
in a finite setting, an instance of probability interval [12]. This comparison is
done in Section 7.3. Its final results (Propositions 7.3, 7.4) show that a VBM is
(the natural extension of) a probability interval in very special instances only,
while a HBM is so (always in a finite setting) if it is coherent, which is still a
rather special situation. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper. This work is an
extended version, with proofs and additional material, of the contribution [3]
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presented at the SMPS 2018 conference. Proofs of results are gathered in the
Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Describing uncertainty
Quite commonly, uncertainty evaluations are made after fixing a partition (also
termed space or universe of discourse) P, i.e., a set of pairwise disjoint events
whose logical sum is the sure event Ω. The evaluations concern the set A(P) of
events logically dependent on P (the powerset of P, in set-theoretic language).
In principle, however, one may well think of evaluating the events of an
arbitrary non-empty set D, without requiring a priori any structure or constraint
on D. This is customary in de Finetti’s approach to Subjective Probability
Theory [5], and was to some extent inherited in Imprecise Probability Theory
[20]. In this paper we shall quite often put D = A(P), but general definitions
and some later development will refer to generic domains D.
The two approaches are linked as follows: given a set of events D = {Ai}i∈I ,
with I an arbitrary (non-empty) index set, we obtain the so-called partition
generated by D, PG = {
∧
i∈I A
′
i}, where A′i may be replaced by either Ai or
its negation ¬Ai, in all possible ways for i ∈ I. The properties of PG are: (a)
any event in D belongs to A(PG), and (b) PG is the coarsest partition with the
property (a).
When computing PG, several events
∧
i∈I A
′
i may be impossible (
∧
i∈I A
′
i =
∅), depending on the relationships among the events in D. Clearly, what inter-
ests is the partition PG \ {∅}. More generally, we assume that the partitions in
the sequel are all made of non-impossible events or atoms, i.e., ω ∈ P implies
also ω 6= ∅.
2.2 Measuring uncertainty
In this paper, we shall encounter several kinds of uncertainty measures, starting
with capacities which, given a partition P, are commonly defined on the set
A(P).
Definition 2.1. An uncertainty measure µ : A(P)→ R is a normalised capac-
ity, or simply a capacity, if µ(∅) = 0, µ(Ω) = 1 (normalisation), and for any
A,B ∈ A(P) such that A⇒ B, it holds that µ(A) ≤ µ(B) (monotonicity).
Capacities are quite common in several kinds of applications (see, e.g., [10]).
A capacity is sometimes named fuzzy measure, although this term is often re-
served for capacities with additional continuity or at least semicontinuity prop-
erties, which we do not require here.
The properties of capacities as uncertainty measures are really minimal. At
the other extreme, we find (precise) probabilities. They may be thought of as
special imprecise probability assessments where the lower probability P : D → R
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and the upper probability P : D → R coincide for any event in D: P = P = P ,
and satisfy some consistency conditions (see Lemma 2.1 later on) [20]. As for
upper and lower probabilities, in a first approach, common in the literature
(see e.g. [20, p. 61]), they are formally both maps from D into R. However,
what matters to let them represent reasonable assessments is which consistency
criterion they satisfy, and here the definitions, within the same criterion, are
different for lower or for upper probabilities. See e.g. the later Definition 2.2
(a) and Definition 2.3 in the case of coherence.
It is also customary to assume conjugacy of P and P , which amounts to the
identity
P (¬A) = 1− P (A), ∀A ∈ D (2)
and lets us refer to lower or alternatively upper probabilities only (if P is defined
on D, its conjugate P is defined on {¬A : A ∈ D}).
Lower/upper probabilities may satisfy consistency criteria of different strength,
and whose properties deviate by various degrees from those of precise proba-
bilities. We group here the ones concerning lower probabilities recalled in the
sequel:
Definition 2.2. [14, 15, 20] Let P : D → R be given, and N be the set of
natural numbers (including 0).
(a) P is a coherent lower probability on D iff, ∀n ∈ N, ∀si ≥ 0, ∀Ai ∈ D,
i = 0, 1, . . . , n, defining
G =
n∑
i=1
si
(
IAi − P (Ai)
)− s0(IA0 − P (A0)),
it holds that maxG ≥ 0.
(b) P is a convex lower probability on D iff (a) holds with the additional
convexity constraint
∑n
i=1 si = s0 = 1.
P is centered convex or C-convex iff it is convex, ∅ ∈ D and P (∅) = 0.
(c) P avoids sure loss on D iff (a) holds with s0 = 0.
(d) P is 2-coherent on D iff, ∀s1 ≥ 0, ∀s0 ∈ R, ∀A0, A1 ∈ D, defining
G2 = s1
(
IA1 − P (A1)
)− s0(IA0 − P (A0)), it holds that maxG2 ≥ 0.
Although Definition 2.2 is axiomatical (and as such would not require further
explanations), it implements the customary interpretation of a lower probability
P (A) as an assessor’s supremum buying price for A (or for its indicator IA)
[1, 19, 20], while an upper probability P (A) is viewed as an infimum selling
price for A.2 In fact, a subject paying P (A) for A achieves a(n elementary)
random gain IA − P (A). The consistency notions in Definition 2.2 require that
no finite linear combination of elementary gains, with certain requirements on
2The assessor is also termed subject, agent, or bettor in the literature. We shall use these
terms as synonyms, and with reference to the betting interpretation recalled here.
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the coefficients or stakes si that vary with the specific notion (a), (b), (c) or (d),
is negative, meaning that the overall gain (G or G2) cannot result in a sure loss
for the assessor/bettor.
In this interpretation, Definition 2.2 operates a betting scheme with variants
as for the allowed stakes. We emphasise that the betting scheme is primarily a(n
abstract) device for eliciting and graduating an assessor’s uncertainty evaluation.
Coherence, a fundamental notion in the approach of [20], is the strongest
among these consistency notions and implies all the other ones. The corre-
sponding consistency concepts for upper probabilities may be derived from the
definitions above and conjugacy (2). We recall explicitly coherence:
Definition 2.3. P : D → R is a coherent upper probability on D iff, ∀n ∈ N,
∀si ≥ 0, ∀Ai ∈ D, i = 0, 1, . . . , n, defining
G =
n∑
i=1
si
(
P (Ai)− IAi
)− s0(P (A0)− IA0),
it holds that maxG ≥ 0.
Again, Definition 2.3 requires that the gain G from any combination of bets
at P -prices, with non-negative coefficients but for at most one, is not always
negative.
Some necessary conditions for coherence are (whenever the relevant lower/
upper probabilities are defined) [20, Section 2.7.4]:
P (A ∨B) ≤ P (A) + P (B) (subadditivity), (3)
P (A ∨B) ≥ P (A) + P (B), if A ∧B = ∅ (superadditivity), (4)
1 + P (A ∧B) ≥ P (A) + P (B). (5)
The definitions of coherence for lower and upper probabilities both weaken
de Finetti’s coherence definition for (precise) probabilities [5], also called dF-
coherence:
Definition 2.4. Let P : D → R be given. P is a (precise) probability dF-
coherent on D iff, ∀n ∈ N, ∀si ∈ R, ∀Ai ∈ D, i = 1, . . . , n, defining
G =
n∑
i=1
si
(
IAi − P (Ai)
)
,
it holds that maxG ≥ 0.
Note that also dF-coherent probabilities are defined on an arbitrary set of
events D. In this paper, we shall use the term (precise) probability to mean
dF-coherent probability. It is possible to characterise (precise) probabilities as
follows [20, Section 2.8.8].
Lemma 2.1. P is a probability on a set D closed under negation (A ∈ D ⇒
¬A ∈ D) iff P avoids sure loss (as a lower probability) and P (A) +P (¬A) = 1,
∀A ∈ D.
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Remark 2.1. We recall for later applications of this lemma that a coherent
lower/upper probability also avoids sure loss, and that if P = P = P and P , P
are conjugate, then necessarily P (A) + P (¬A) = 1, ∀A ∈ D.
A lower probability P is 2-monotone on A(P) if
P (A ∨B) ≥ P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∧B), ∀A,B ∈ A(P), (6)
while an upper probability P is 2-alternating on A(P) if the reverse inequality
holds:
P (A ∨B) ≤ P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∧B), ∀A,B ∈ A(P). (7)
2-monotonicity is not implied by coherence: if P is coherent it need not sat-
isfy (6) but only the weaker condition (5). Conversely, 2-monotonicity of P
implies its coherence if further P (∅) = 0, P (Ω) = 1 (otherwise it may not:
P (A) = c ∈ R, ∀A ∈ A(P), is 2-monotone but not coherent) [19, Corollary
6.16]. In the theory of Imprecise Probabilities, the importance of 2-monotonicity
is essentially computational [1, Section 4.3]: it simplifies an important inferen-
tial procedure termed natural extension, allowing its computation by means
of the Choquet integral [19, Theorem 6.14]. Further, in a finite environment,
2-monotonicity reduces the search of the vertexes of the set of all precise prob-
abilities dominating P (the credal set) to the simpler task of finding the so-
called Weber set, see e.g. [13, Section 5.3]. A behavioural interpretation of
2-monotonicity is available for gambles: it is related to comonotone additiv-
ity [19, Theorem 6.22], an important property in many fields, including risk
measurement [6, Section 2.2.3.6].
It can be easily seen that, given P and P that are conjugate, P has the
same degree of consistency as P : it is coherent (2-coherent, . . . ) iff P is so, and
satisfies (7) iff P satisfies (6).
Among the coherent models, the Pari-Mutuel model will play a basic role in
the sequel. It was originally devised for betting with horse racing, and studied
in the framework of imprecise probabilities by [12, 17, 20], among others.
Definition 2.5. PPMM : A(P) → R is a Pari-Mutuel lower probability if
PPMM(A) = max{(1 + δ)P0(A)− δ, 0}, ∀A ∈ A(P), where P0 is a given prob-
ability and δ ∈ R+. Its conjugate upper probability is PPMM(A) = min{(1 +
δ)P0(A), 1}. (PPMM, PPMM) constitute a Pari-Mutuel Model (PMM).
In the PMM, PPMM is 2-monotone, PPMM is 2-alternating. As for P0, we
may think that it is a known or ‘true’ probability, but that does not express
a subject’s own buying/selling prices. And in fact, in real-world situations a
bookie does not sell A for what s/he believes is its fair price P0(A), but for a
higher amount P (A). This is indeed necessary, at least to cover the bookie’s
costs, and further to guarantee a profit in the long run.
Some of the concepts we have recalled can be approached alternatively, by
means of Envelope Theorems [14, 20].
Theorem 2.1 (Envelope Theorems).
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(a) P : D → R is coherent on D iff there is a non-empty set M of precise
probabilities such that
P (A) = min{P (A) : P ∈M}, ∀A ∈ D.
(b) P : D → R is coherent on D iff there is a non-empty set M of precise
probabilities such that
P (A) = max{P (A) : P ∈M}, ∀A ∈ D.
(c) P : D → R is convex on D iff there exist a non-empty set M of precise
probabilities and a function α :M→ R such that
P (A) = min{P (A) + α(P ) : P ∈M}, ∀A ∈ D.
Envelope theorems justify a further interpretation of coherent lower proba-
bilities, historically arising from statistical robustness arguments [11]: if we are
uncertain about which is the ‘true’ probability in a setM, we may prudentially
obtain an evaluation P by taking the lower envelope inM. The probabilities in
M may also be given by different experts. In the case of convex probabilities,
the function α(P ) lets us modify/correct the opinion of any single expert.3
As for 2-coherent lower probabilities, the following characterisation, proven
in [16, Proposition 4], will turn to be useful later on.
Proposition 2.1. Let P : D → R+∪{0}, with D negation-invariant (A ∈ D ⇒
¬A ∈ D). Then P is 2-coherent iff it satisfies the following:
(i) ∀A,B ∈ D, A⇒ B implies P (A) ≤ P (B),
(ii) ∀A ∈ D, P (A) + P (¬A) ≤ 1,
(iii) if ∅ ∈ D, P (∅) = 0, P (Ω) = 1.
Remark 2.2. If D = A(P), by Proposition 2.1 a 2-coherent P is a capacity
with the additional property (ii). Using (ii) and (2), the conjugate P is such
that
P (A) = 1− P (¬A) ≥ P (A), ∀A ∈ A(P).
In other words, 2-coherence is a minimal consistency concept that guarantees
the natural inequality P ≥ P for conjugate P , P .
Formally, 2-coherence is a special case of n-coherence, defined in [20, Ap-
pendix B]. Its properties are studied, also in a desirability approach, in the more
general framework of conditional gambles in [15].
3A further important motivation for introducing convex probabilities, or previsions when
referring to gambles, is their one-to-one correspondence with convex risk measures, see [8, 14]
for more information.
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3 Nearly-Linear Models
In this section Nearly-Linear (NL) models are defined, and their basic properties
are established.
Let for this µ : A(P)→ R be either a lower or an upper probability.
Definition 3.1. µ : A(P) → R is a Nearly-Linear (NL) imprecise probability
iff µ(∅) = 0, µ(Ω) = 1 and, given a probability P0 on A(P), a ∈ R, b > 0,
∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω},
µ(A)
def
= min{max{bP0(A) + a, 0}, 1}
(
= max{min{bP0(A) + a, 1}, 0}
)
. (8)
Thus, a NL imprecise probability is a linear affine transformation with bar-
riers of the probability P0. The barriers prevent the transformation from taking
values outside the interval [0, 1].
Lemma 3.1. A NL µ is a capacity.
Remark 3.1. The case b < 0 is ruled out from Definition 3.1 to ensure mono-
tonicity of µ without further, overly restrictive requirements. In fact, if b < 0
and A ⇒ B, it is µ(A) > µ(B) whenever µ(A) = bP0(A) + a > 0 and either
0 < P0(A) < P0(B) or P0(A) = 0 < P0(B), b > − aP0(B) , but it is also possible
that µ(A) = 1 > µ(B), for appropriate values of P0, a, b.
By contrast, µ is a capacity when b = 0 if further 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. We did not
include this special situation in Definition 3.1, but shall discuss it in Section
6.2.
If µ is given by Definition 3.1, we shall say shortly that µ is NL(a, b).
An interesting feature of the family of NL models is that it is closed with
respect to conjugacy : if µ is NL(a, b), also its conjugate µc(A) = 1 − µ(¬A),
∀A ∈ A(P), is NL(c, b):
Proposition 3.1. If µ is NL(a, b), then µc is NL(c, b), with
c = 1− (a+ b). (9)
By Proposition 3.1, a NL model is made of a couple of conjugate capacities.
As we shall see as a follow-up of the next propositions (see especially the com-
ment after Proposition 3.3 and the conclusions in item (i), Section 3.1), they
can be interpreted as a lower and its conjugate upper probability, and P ≤ P .
We start by preliminarily fixing the notation in the following
Definition 3.2. A Nearly-Linear Model is a couple (P , P ) of conjugate lower
and upper probabilities on A(P) where P (hence also P , by Proposition 3.1) is a
NL imprecise probability, usually denoted by NL(a, b), while P is NL(c, b), with
c given by (9).
Example 3.1. In the PMM, PPMM is NL(−δ, 1 + δ), PPMM is NL(0, 1 + δ).
Here a = −δ, b = 1 + δ, and c = 0, corresponding to a+ b = 1.
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Given a couple (µ, µc), Definition 3.2 is uninformative as to which between µ
and µc should be regarded as a lower probability. Clearly, when, say, µ includes
a known model µ∗ as a special case, such as for instance the lower probability
of a PMM, µ will be a lower or upper probability if µ∗ is so. More generally,
the maximum consistency principle may be applied: µ is a lower probability if
it determines a model with a higher degree of consistency than interpreting µ
as an upper probability.
Applying the maximum consistency principle makes sense because the consis-
tency properties of a NL µ may vary, depending on the choice of the parameters
a, b. This appears already in the following Proposition 3.2. Prior to it, we define
the sets Nµ,Uµ, Eµ, of, respectively, null, universal, essential events according
to µ (following the terminology in [2]).
Definition 3.3. Given an uncertainty measure µ, define:
Nµ = {A ∈ A(P) : µ(A) = 0},
Uµ = {A ∈ A(P) : µ(A) = 1},
Eµ = A(P) \ (Nµ ∪ Uµ).
When µ is NL(a, b), we can easily describe these sets in terms of a, b, using
(8):
Nµ =
{
A ∈ A(P) : P0(A) ≤ −ab
} ∪ {∅}, (10)
Uµ =
{
A ∈ A(P) : P0(A) ≥ 1−ab
} ∪ {Ω}, (11)
Eµ =
{
A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω} : −ab < P0(A) < 1−ab
}
. (12)
Since a NL model typically gives extreme evaluations to a number of events
whose probability P0 is strictly between 0 and 1, determining Nµ,Uµ, Eµ informs
us more precisely on this aspect. We shall discuss the structure of Nµ and Uµ
in a more general context, in Section 7.1.
Proposition 3.2. Let P be a NL(a, b) lower probability on A(P). Then P is
2-coherent if
b+ 2a ≤ 1. (13)
The results in the next lemma are related to Proposition 3.2:
Lemma 3.2. Let (P , P ) be a NL model. Then
(a) b+ 2a ≤ 1 iff b+ 2c ≥ 1.
(b) ∀A ∈ EP ∩ EP , P (A)− P (A) = 1− (b+ 2a).
Proof. Immediate, using (9) for (a), and (2), (8) for (b).
Recalling that the conjugate µc of µ has the same consistency properties of
µ, by Lemma 3.2 (a) we get the upper probability version of Proposition 3.2:
10
Proposition 3.3. Let P be a NL(c, b) upper probability on A(P). Then P is
2-coherent if b+ 2c ≥ 1.
Comment. As for Lemma 3.2 (b), it tells us that the imprecision P (A)−P (A)
of a NL model is constant on EP ∩ EP . Clearly, when we speak of imprecision
in these terms it is understood that P ≥ P . In Lemma 3.2 (b), this is true for
A ∈ EP ∩ EP iff (13) holds. More generally, if (13) holds, then P (A) ≥ P (A)
for any A ∈ A(P) is implied by 2-coherence of P , see Remark 2.2. By contrast,
P ≥ P is not guaranteed if (P , P ) is a generic couple of conjugate measures.
However, we shall see later on in the paper that all NL measures can be given
an interpretation as either lower or upper probabilities that are (at least) 2-
coherent.
The equality b+ 2a = 1 is a limiting situation in Proposition 3.2. The next
proposition and comments provide more insight for this case.
Proposition 3.4. Let (P , P ) be a NL model (Definition 3.2).
(a) If b+ 2a = 1, then P = P .
(b) If b+ 2a 6= 1 and P = P = P , then P is 0-1 valued.
From a first glance at Proposition 3.4 (a) one might be tempted to infer
that condition b + 2a = 1 is enough to obtain NL models where P = P = P
is a precise probability. Yet, this is very often not the case. Just think for this
that P may distort P0 so that there exist k pairwise disjoint events A1, . . . , Ak
such that P (Ai) = 0, i = 1, . . . , k, while P (
∨k
i=1Ai) > 0, which makes P
non-additive. For instance, take (with 0 < −a < b) P0(Ai) ∈ ] − akb ,−ab [,
i = 1, . . . , k. Then (10) ensures that P (Ai) = 0, ∀i, while P (
∨k
i=1Ai) > 0 since
P0(
∨k
i=1Ai) > − akbk = −ab . For a result pointing out the constraints to obtain
a probability P , see the later Proposition 5.10.
On the other hand, we may obtain a probability P also when b+2a 6= 1, but
then P is necessarily 0-1 valued by Proposition 3.4 (b). Thus P is concentrated
on a single atom of P, when P is finite, while it is possible that P (ω) = 0,
∀ω ∈ P, when P is infinite.
We remark that P = P may also be 0-1 valued but not a precise probability,
while P and P may or may not be coherent as imprecise probabilities (cf. the
later Example 5.2).
In general, the role of precise probabilities within NL models is essentially
marginal, as we shall also see when studying the various NL submodels.
3.1 Nearly-Linear submodels
In the next sections we shall investigate the submodels forming the family of
NL models. Our previous results are useful for determining such submodels. In
fact, consider a generic NL measure µ(pac, b), where the parameter pac can be
either a (when we interpret µ as a lower probability) or c (when µ is an upper
probability). Then:
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(i) Propositions 3.2, 3.3 and Lemma 3.2 (a) suggest that µ should be regarded
as a lower or upper probability according to whether, respectively, b +
2pac < 1 or b + 2pac > 1 (µ = P = P when b + 2pac = 1, by Proposition
3.4). This ensures 2-coherence of µ, µc, and hence the very desirable
property P ≥ P .
(ii) Example 3.1 shows that the PMM is a relevant special case of NL model,
with a+ b = 1. This suggests modifying this equality to either a+ b ≤ 1
or a+ b ≥ 1 (while keeping throughout b > 0 by Remark 3.1), in order to
classify NL models that generalise the PMM.
(iii) In the PMM, a < 0 and c = 0. Thus we have to consider the relaxations
a ≥ 0, c 6= 0. Note that, by (9), c > 0, c = 0, c < 0 iff, respectively,
a + b < 1, a + b = 1, a + b > 1. Therefore, (ii) and (iii) require checking
whether a+ b < 1, a+ b = 1, a+ b > 1, and the sign of a.
Thus, given µ(pac, b), we may first fix pac = a if b + 2pac < 1, pac = c if
b+ 2pac > 1, then check whether pac > 0, pac < 0 and b+ pac > 1, b+ pac < 1.
If pac = a, then conditions pac > 0 and pac + b > 1 become respectively a > 0,
a + b > 1; if pac = c, they reduce to, respectively, a + b < 1, a < 0. Given
that we are exploring three alternatives, following (i), (ii), (iii) (we omit for
the moment the limit situations such as b + 2a = 1 - they are treated within
the submodel study in the next sections), there are at most 8 distinct cases.
Actually, they give rise to three NL (sub)models. We list them in Table 1.
Case Parameter constraints µ pac Model
1 b+ 2pac < 1, pac < 0, pac + b < 1 P a VBM
2 b+ 2pac > 1, pac > 0, pac + b > 1 P c VBM
3 b+ 2pac < 1, pac < 0, pac + b > 1 P a HBM
4,5 b+ 2pac > 1, pac < 0, pac + b 6= 1 P c HBM
6 b+ 2pac < 1, pac > 0, pac + b < 1 P a RRM
7 b+ 2pac > 1, pac > 0, pac + b < 1 P c RRM
8 b+ 2pac < 1, pac > 0, pac + b > 1 − − Impossible
Table 1: The Nearly-Linear (sub)models. For each model, the parameter
constraints for its lower and upper probability are described in two consecutive
lines (limit situations are omitted here). See Section 4 for the Vertical Barrier
Model (VBM), Section 5 for the Horizontal Barrier Model (HBM), Section 6.1
for the Restricted Range Model (RRM).
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3.2 Evaluating Uncertainty with NL Models
A NL model is a neighbourhood model, meaning that it obtains an uncertainty
evaluation from a given probability P0 by modifying it. Often, P0 may be a
reliable uncertainty assessment, possibly given by some expert or arising from
symmetry judgements. Thus, why should P0 be altered to obtain P , P from it?
The reason is that, in a betting scheme, P0 is unfit as a selling price, because,
being a fair price, it does not ensure an expected positive gain to the seller [5]. A
symmetric argument may be brought forth for introducing P . In both cases, the
betting scheme aims to model real situations, from the world of betting but not
only: for instance, the role of ‘bookie’ might be that of an insurer, a broker, and
so on. We have already recalled in the Introduction a motivation of this kind for
using the PMM. In the next sections, we shall see that NL models offer various
ways of modifying P0, that may correspond to an assessor’s different beliefs and
attitudes, in particular towards events of extreme or nearly P0-probability, and
that some of them may be conflicting.
4 The Vertical Barrier Model
In this section we introduce a first family of NL models. We require that µ is a
NL(a, b) measure such that
0 ≤ a+ b ≤ 1, a ≤ 0. (14)
It is easy to see that conditions (14) may be obtained from Case 1 in Table 1,
relaxing the strict inequalities there.
Recalling (ii) in Section 3.1, conditions (14) provide a relaxation of the PMM
parameters. In fact, when a+ b = 1 and a = −δ < 0, hence b = 1 + δ > 0, µ is
the lower probability of a PMM (Example 3.1).4
Further, putting a = 0, b = ε < 1, we obtain the lower probability of the
ε-contamination model (also termed linear-vacuous mixture in [20]):
P (A) = εP0(A), ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {Ω}, P (Ω) = 1.
Lastly, when a + b = 0, from (10) it is Nµ = A(P) \ {Ω}, i.e., µ is the vacuous
lower probability PV , equal to 0, ∀A ∈ A(P)\{Ω}. It is easily seen that allowing
a + b to be negative would make us obtain again only PV , hence we canceled
this choice for a, b.
Thus, it is clear that µ is a lower probability. It is also immediate to recognise
that P (hence P ) is 2-coherent, by Proposition 3.2: Equation (14) implies that
b+ 2a ≤ 1.
Since bP0(A) + a ≤ a+ b ≤ 1, for all A ∈ A(P), Equation (8) simplifies to
µ(A) = max{bP0(A) + a, 0}, ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {Ω}
(note that µ(∅) is also computed with this formula). The conjugate upper
probability is easily obtained using (9). Summing up, we define
4When a = 0, b = 1, µ is the probability P0. We shall hereafter neglect this subcase.
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Definition 4.1. A Vertical Barrier Model (VBM) is a NL model where P and
its conjugate P are given by:
P (A) = max{bP0(A) + a, 0}, ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {Ω}, P (Ω) = 1, (15)
P (A) = min{bP0(A) + c, 1}, ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅}, P (∅) = 0, (16)
with a, b satisfying (14) and c given by (9).
A VBM satisfies stronger consistency properties than 2-coherence:
Proposition 4.1. In a VBM, P and P are coherent. Further, P is 2-monotone,
P is 2-alternating.
In the next proposition, we explore how P and P are related to P0 in a
VBM. It can be easily proven, see also [3, Section 4].
Proposition 4.2. Let (P , P ) be a VBM. Then, concerning P :
i) P (A) ≥ P0(A),∀A;
ii) P (A) ↓ c ≥ 0 as P0(A) ↓ 0;
iii) P (A) = 1 iff P0(A) ≥ 1−cb = b+ab .
Correspondingly, for P :
i′) P (A) ≤ P0(A), ∀A;
ii′) P (A) ↑ a+ b ≤ 1 as P0(A) ↑ 1;
iii′) P (A) = 0 iff P0(A) ≤ −ab .
Firstly let us discuss P , comparing it with its special case c = 0, i.e., a+b = 1
(and b > 1), which specialises P (A) into PPMM(A) = min{bP0(A), 1}. In
the betting interpretation, a subject assessing either P or PPMM is essentially
unwilling to sell events whose reference or ‘true’ probability P0 is too high, by
iii), and in any case her/his selling price is not less than the ‘fair’ price P0, by
i). Unlike PPMM, P adds a further barrier regarding low probability events:
by ii), if c > 0 the P -agent is not willing to sell (too) low probability events
for less than c. We may deduce that, ceteris paribus, the P -agent is, loosely
speaking, greedier than the PPMM-agent. This can be easily justified in real-
world situations: if the agent is, for instance, a bookmaker or an insurer, c > 0
may take account of the agent’s fixed costs in managing any bet/contract.
A representation in the (P0, P ) plane is helpful to visualise the above facts.
In Figure 1, 1), a VBM P (c, b), with c < 1, is drawn with a continuous bold line.
It is compared with a PMM upper probability (dashed bold line) PPMM(A) =
min{b′P0(A), 1}. Choosing b′ = b1−c emphasises at best the core difference
between P and PPMM: while the horizontal barrier on the line P = 1 is in this
case the same for both models, the VBM originates the vertical barrier of length
c on the P axis (dotted segment), not existing with any PPMM.
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Figure 1: 1) Plots of P (c, b) (continuous bold line) and PPMM(0, b
′) (dashed bold
line), with b′ = b1−c , against P0 (P , PPMM overlap at the line P = PPMM = 1).
2) Plots of P (continuous bold line) and its conjugate P (dashed bold line)
against P0.
In general, while c measures the agent’s advantage at P0 = 0, b determines
how it varies with P0 growing. In fact, the advantage is unchanged, decreasing
or increasing according to whether it is, respectively, b = 1, b < 1, b > 1.
Turning to the interpretation of P in the VBM, now the P -agent acts as a
buyer, but by ii′) does not want to pay more than a+b for any event, even those
whose probability P0 is very high. If a + b < 1, this ensures that the agent’s
gain from the transaction, G = IA − P (A), has a positive maximum (achieved
when A occurs): maxG = 1−P (A) ≥ 1− (a+ b) > 0. By contrast, maxG→ 0
as P0(A) → 1 if a + b = 1, as in the PMM. Thus, P in the typical VBM (i.e.,
such that a + b < 1) introduces an additional vertical barrier with respect to
PPMM: the dotted segment in the P0 = 1 line of Figure 1, 2). The parameters
a, b jointly influence the barrier width 1−(a+b). The ratio −ab is the supremum
probability P0(A) such that the agent is not willing to buy A unless for free. If
−ab ≥ 12 , the agent’s attitude is over-prudential : an event A is bought only if
its probability P0 is higher than that of its negation.
Remark 4.1. The representations in the (P0, P ) or (P0, P ) plane do not imply
that P or P is always a function of P0. For instance, take the VBM with
a+ b < 1: when P0 = 1, P may take the value a+ b but also (at Ω) the value 1.
As for the existence of precise probabilities within the VBM, from Propo-
sition 4.2 i), i′), any such probability P = P = P coincides with P0, which is
then the only precise probability within this model.
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5 The Horizontal Barrier Model
To introduce a second family of NL models, let now µ be a NL(a, b) measure,
with the conditions
a+ b ≥ 1, b+ 2a ≤ 1. (17)
While the VBM relaxes the PMM equality a + b = 1 to a + b ≤ 1, now the
opposite generalisation a+ b ≥ 1 is made. Further, the VBM condition a ≤ 0 in
(14) ensures that b+ 2a ≤ 1 there, while here this is explicitly required in (17).
Conditions (17) are also straightforwardly obtained from µ(pac, b) satisfying the
(relaxed) parameter constraints of Case 3 in Table 1.
Again, a + b = 1 implies a ≤ 0 and thus we reobtain the PMM. For the
sequel, we modify (17) to
a+ b > 1, b+ 2a ≤ 1, (18)
to focus on the models in this family that are not PMMs.
Note that conditions (18) imply easily that
a < 0, b > 1. (19)
Proposition 5.1. Let µ(a, b) : A(P) → R be a NL measure satisfying (18).
Then µ is a 2-coherent lower probability, and its conjugate µc(c, b) is a 2-
coherent upper probability.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 3.2, Lemma 3.2 (a) and Proposition
3.3.
From Proposition 5.1, µ (µc) is conveniently viewed as a lower (an upper)
probability. We define then:
Definition 5.1. A Horizontal Barrier Model (HBM) is a NL model where a, b
are as in (18) (as in (17) if we wanted to include PMMs), c = 1− (a+ b) < 0
and, ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω},
P (A) = min{max{bP0(A) + a, 0}, 1}, (20)
P (A) = max{min{bP0(A) + c, 1}, 0}. (21)
5.1 Beliefs elicited by a HBM
To clarify what sort of beliefs are conveyed by a HBM, let us first state some
properties of these models. They are easily established.
Proposition 5.2. Let (P , P ) be a HBM. Then, concerning P
j) P (A) > P0(A) iff 1 > P0(A) > − ab−1 ;
jj) P (A) = 0 iff P0(A) ≤ −ab ; NP0 ⊂ NP ;
jjj) P (A) = 1 iff P0(A) ≥ 1−ab ; UP0 ⊂ UP .
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As for P ,
j′) P (A) < P0(A) iff 0 < P0(A) < − cb−1 ;
jj′) P (A) = 0 iff P0(A) ≤ − cb ; NP0 ⊂ NP ;
jjj′) P (A) = 1 iff P0(A) ≥ 1−cb ; UP0 ⊂ UP .
It is also easy to see (using (18), (19)) that the conditions in Proposition 5.2
are not vacuous, i.e., may be satisfied by some event [3].
Conditions j), jj), jjj) point out an interesting feature of P in the HBM: the
beliefs it represents may be conflicting and, partly, irrational. In fact, assuming
again that P0 is the ‘true’ probability for the events in A(P), by j) the assessor
is willing to buy some events for less, others for more than their probability P0.
In the extreme situations, by jj) and jjj), the assessor would not buy events
whose probability is too low, whilst would certainly buy a high probability event
A at the price of 1, gaining from the transaction at most 0 (if A occurs). Thus
the assessor underestimates the potential losses of a transaction regarding high
probability events, but overestimates them with low probability events. Note
also that P broadens, with respect to P0, both the set of null events (NP0 ⊂ NP )
and the set of universal events (UP0 ⊂ UP ).
It is then natural to wonder whether the model limits somehow its non-
prudential side, or which of the conflicting moods prevails. In some sense, the
prudential one.
In fact, while the assessor’s behaviour can be more prudential than P0 sug-
gests on both A and its negation ¬A, s/he cannot offer a higher price than
P0 for both. If, for instance, s/he does so for A, so that P (A) > P0(A), then
necessarily P (¬A) < P0(¬A): if not, P (A) + P (¬A) > P0(A) + P0(¬A) = 1, a
contradiction by Proposition 2.1 (ii), since P is 2-coherent.
Secondly, note that by jj) and jjj) the HBM sets up two horizontal barriers
in the (P0, P ) plane (cf. Figure 2, 1)). The lower (prudential) barrier is a
segment with measure −ab , the upper barrier (in the imprudent area) a segment
measuring 1− 1−ab . Outside the limit situation b+ 2a = 1, the upper barrier is
narrower: −ab > 1 − 1−ab iff b + 2a < 1, true by (18). Similarly, the boundary
probability P0 between the opposite attitudes is set at − ab−1 , larger or at worst
equal to 12 , by (18). Although these properties have a partly qualitative flavour,
being uninformative about how many events A are such that P (A) > P0(A) and
about their ‘measure of imprudence’ P (A)−P0(A), they nevertheless represent
a restriction to the imprudent attitude.
To guarantee that there may be events A such that P (A) > P0(A), the
condition a+ b > 1 (not holding with the PMM and the VBM) is essential: in
fact it is equivalent in the HBM to − ab−1 < 1, ensuring that the graph of P
intersects the line P = P0 for P0 ∈ ]0, 1[.
Turning to P , we get to specular conclusions. Again the P -assessor is subject
to conflicting moods: s/he is unwilling to sell high probability events, but would
give away for free low probability events. The lower barrier represents now the
imprudent behaviour at its utmost degree. Its length − cb is smaller or at worst
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Figure 2: Plots of P , P against P0 in the HBM. P and P are dashed bold in their
prudential part, continuous bold otherwise. 1) P against P0. 2) Its conjugate
P against P0.
equal to the length 1− 1−cb of the upper barrier, because b+ 2c ≥ 1 by Lemma
3.2 (a) (equality holds iff b + 2c = 1). The upper barrier emphasises now the
cautious attitude. See also Figure 2, 2) for a graphical illustration.
From the discussion above, one would probably guess that the HBM can be
no more than 2-coherent, thus crediting the partly irrational beliefs it represents
with lack of coherence. Perhaps surprisingly, while this is true for the ‘typical’
HBM, coherence is compatible with some HBM. Even more, there are instances
of P (and P ) which are precise probabilities, as in the following example.
Example 5.1. Given P = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, define the probability P0 as in Table 2.
Choosing b = 1.25, a = −0.15, Equation (18) holds, with b + 2a = 0.95 6= 1,
while c = −0.10. Thus (P , P ) is a HBM, and P , P may be computed with (20),
(21). The results are displayed in Table 2, and P = P = P , with P a precise
probability (concentrated on ω3).
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω1 ∨ ω2 ω1 ∨ ω3 ω2 ∨ ω3 ∅ Ω
P0 0.02 0.02 0.96 0.04 0.98 0.98 0 1
P 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
P 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
Table 2: Values of P0, P , P in Example 5.1.
In the next subsection, we investigate more closely coherent HBMs.
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5.2 Coherent upper/lower probabilities within HBMs
In order to study the properties of coherent imprecise probabilities within HBMs,
it is convenient to suppose first that (P , P ) is defined on A(P), with P a finite
partition.
The following proposition is a first result, which is instrumental in the proofs
of later propositions:
Proposition 5.3. Let P : A(P) → R be an upper probability satisfying mono-
tonicity and subadditivity (i.e., condition (3)). Suppose that P = {ω1, . . . , ωn}.
Then, for any A ∈ A(P),
(a) A ∈ NP iff A =
k∨
i=1
ωji , with ωji ∈ NP , i = 1, . . . , k (if k = 0,
k∨
i=1
ωji = ∅).
Suppose further that P is the upper probability of a HBM. Then also:
(b) A ∈ EP iff A = ω+∨
k∨
i=1
ωji , with ω
+ ∈ EP (ω+ ∈ P), ωji ∈ NP , P0(ωji) =
0, i = 1, . . . , k (if k = 0,
k∨
i=1
ωji = ∅);
(c) if A ∈ EP , there exists ω∗ ∈ EP ∪ UP (ω∗ ∈ P), ω∗ 6= ω+, such that
bP0(ω
+) + c+ bP0(ω
∗) + c ≥ 1. (22)
Corollary 5.1. In the hypotheses of Proposition 5.3, ∀A ∈ EP , there exists one
and only one ω+ ∈ P such that P (A) = P (ω+).
Although its proof is essentially contained in that of Proposition 5.3, Corol-
lary 5.1 highlights an important hindrance of subadditivity, hence also of coher-
ence, of P in the HBM.
In fact, if P is subadditive (or coherent) in Definition 5.1, then necessarily
any event A whose upper probability is non-trivial (P (A) ∈ ]0, 1[) is made of
a certain number of atoms of P, only one of which, ω+, has positive upper
probability, and P (A) = P (ω+). In other words, the remaining atoms are
irrelevant for forming the upper probability P (A). Immediate follow-ups of
Proposition 5.3 (b) and Corollary 5.1 are also, for a subadditive P , putting
n
def
= |P|:
i) The number of distinct values of P on A(P) is at most n+ 2.
ii) If it is exactly n+ 2, these are the upper probabilities of ∅,Ω, and of the n
atoms of P. If A ∈ A(P) \ (P∪{∅}), then, since NP = {∅}, P (A) = 1, i.e.,
P is vacuous on all non-atomic events (because any such event is implied
by at least two atoms in EP , and Proposition 5.3 (b) applies).
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Note that ii) is a more restrictive constraint than the maxitivity condition
P (A) = max
ω⇒A
P (ω) satisfied by possibility measures, which are already rather
special kinds of coherent upper probabilities [1, Section 4.6.1]. This does not,
however, imply that any coherent P in a HBM is a possibility measure: in fact,
possibilities require that there exists ω∗ ∈ P such that P (ω∗) = 1, while P mail
fail to satisfy this condition.
A less immediate consequence of subadditivity is a steepening effect on the
parameter b, implied by the following result.
Proposition 5.4. In a HBM, let P : A(P) → R be subadditive. If P is finite
and |EP ∩ P| ≥ 2m > 0, then
b > max
{
m, max
ωi,ωj∈EP
i 6=j
1
P (ωi) + P (ωj)
}
. (23)
Thus, a higher number of atoms in EP requires a larger b in a subadditive
P . In Figure 2, 2), this makes steeper the non-horizontal plot of P against P0,
a segment on the line P = bP0 + c. On its turn, a larger b increases the width
− cb = a+b−1b of the lower barrier, which seems contradictory, since the barrier
is in the risk-seeking area for P . This fact is counterbalanced by the increase
in the number of events of A(P) in the risk-averse area (because they are given
P = 1).
The restrictions pointed out for a coherent P in the HBM all depend on its
subadditivity. As a matter of fact, subadditivity turns out to be equivalent to
coherence of P , even with arbitrary (infinite) partitions P.
Proposition 5.5. Let P : A(P) → R be the upper probability of a HBM, with
P an arbitrary (finite or not) partition. Then P is coherent if and only if it is
subadditive.
It is easy to check that P is subadditive if and only if its conjugate P satisfies
property (5). Thus Proposition 5.5 has the following, slightly less straightfor-
ward, correspondent for lower probabilities:
Proposition 5.6. A lower probability P : A(P) → R in a HBM is coherent if
and only if P (A) + P (B) ≤ 1 + P (A ∧B), ∀A,B ∈ A(P).
Interestingly, even though superadditivity is not, so to say, the conjugate
property for lower probabilities of subadditivity, it nevertheless holds for any
lower probability in the HBM, even those that are 2-coherent but not coherent:
Proposition 5.7. Given a HBM, its lower probability P is superadditive, i.e.,
satisfies (4).
It is easy to see that the conjugate P of a superadditive P satisfies the
following property [20, Section 2.7.4, (f)]:
P (A) + P (B) ≥ 1 + P (A ∧B), if A ∨B = Ω. (24)
Therefore, the result corresponding to Proposition 5.7 holds:
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Proposition 5.8. In a HBM, its upper probability P satisfies property (24).
Finally, we prove the following remarkable result for coherent lower/upper
probabilities in the HBM:
Proposition 5.9. If, in a HBM, P (P ) is coherent, then it is 2-alternating
(2-monotone).
5.3 Precise probabilities within HBMs
The HBM is the only NL submodel offering a certain variety of precise proba-
bilities as its special cases. In Example 5.1, the assumptions of Proposition 3.4
(b) are satisfied, and P is in fact 0-1 valued. Furthermore, it is also a precise
probability.
If P0 is 0-1 valued, the HBM transforms P0 into itself, i.e., P = P = P0.
This ensues from Proposition 5.2: taking for instance P , from jj), jjj) we have
A(P) = NP0 ∪ UP0 ⊂ NP ∪ UP , implying EP = ∅ (note that with the VBM
instead, in general the inclusion NP0 ⊂ NP is false).
We remark that there are 0-1 valued lower/upper probabilities in the HBM
that are not precise probabilities, when b + 2a 6= 1, and that may or may not
be coherent, as in the next example.
Example 5.2. Let P = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. In Table 3, P = P is obtained from the
uniform probability P0 by (20), (21), with a = −4, b = 8.5. P (hence P ) is not
coherent by Proposition 5.5, being not subadditive: P (ω1)+P (ω2) < P (ω1∨ω2).
In the same Table 3, P ′ and its conjugate P
′
are given by (20), (21) from
P ′0, with a = −4, b = 6. Using Propositions 5.5 or 5.6, it may be checked that
P ′, P
′
are coherent (but they are not probability measures).
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω1 ∨ ω2 ω1 ∨ ω3 ω2 ∨ ω3 ∅ Ω
P0
1
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
2
3
2
3 0 1
P = P 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
P ′0
1
2
29
60
1
60
59
60
31
60
1
2 0 1
P ′ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
P
′
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
Table 3: Values for Example 5.2.
There are also precise probabilities within the HBM that are not necessarily
0-1 valued, if b+ 2a = 1. These measures must satisfy severe constraints.
A general question is when P , P in a HBM coincide and are a precise prob-
ability. The next result gives an answer in the finite case, showing explicitly
how special this situation is. The later Proposition 5.11 is more general, but
less meaningful in letting us evaluate the rarity of the precise probabilities.
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Proposition 5.10. Let P , P in a HBM be coherent on A(P), P a finite partition.
Then P = P = P ( 6= P0), P probability, if and only if one of the following holds:
(a) ∃ω+ ∈ P : P (ω+) = P (ω+) = 1, and P (ω) = P (ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ P \ {ω+};
(b) a = c < 0, and |EP ∩ P| = 2.
It is interesting to point out that while a coherent P in a HBM may assume
at most |P|+ 2 distinct values on A(P), as seen in Section 5.2, Proposition 5.10
implies that P , as a probability, may take at most 4 values. This gives a clear
idea of how restrictive precision is within HBMs.
In Example 5.1 we have already encountered a HBM probability P meeting
case (a) of Proposition 5.10. In the next example P satisfies case (b) of the same
Proposition 5.10.
Example 5.3. Let again P = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. Take a = −0.125, b = 1.25 (hence
b+ 2a = 1), and define
P0(ω1) = 0.3, P0(ω2) = 0.7, P0(ω3) = 0.
Using (20) or (21), we obtain (P = P =)P given by:
P (ω1) = P (ω1 ∨ ω3) = 0.25, P (ω2) = P (ω2 ∨ ω3) = 0.75,
P (ω1 ∨ ω2) = P (Ω) = 1, P (ω3) = 0.
P is a precise probability.
Proposition 5.11. In a HBM, it is P = P = P , P a probability measure, if
and only if, ∀A,B ∈ A(P),
(a) P (A ∨B) ≤ P (A) + P (B);
(b) P (A) + P (B) ≤ 1 + P (A ∧B).
6 Other Nearly-Linear Models
We investigate in this section the third NL model arising from the classification
of Table 1, and discuss an extreme model that can be accommodated into the
framework of NL models.
6.1 The Restricted Range Model
A look at Table 1 suggests that there is just one family of lower probabilities still
missing in our analysis of NL models, identified by the parameter constraints
of Case 6 (roughly: some strict inequalities might be relaxed, admitting the
equality). Correspondingly, from the starting point of the PMM, we have so far
seen the cases a+b ≤ 1 and a+b ≥ 1, while keeping the PMM constraint a ≤ 0.
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Thus, it remains to explore the case of a positive a. From these considerations,
we introduce in this section µ, a NL(a, b) measure, with the constraints
b+ 2a ≤ 1, a > 0. (25)
In principle, a = 0 could be allowed too. This corresponds to the lower prob-
ability of the ε-contamination model, included also in the VBM. We prefer to
rule out this case, to avoid overlapping with the VBM.
From inequalities (25), it follows straightforwardly that
a+ b < 1, b < 1.
Clearly, µ is a lower probability, and since 0 < a ≤ bP0(A) + a ≤ b + a < 1,
Equation (8) simplifies to
µ(A) = bP0(A) + a, ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω}.
Using (9) for the conjugate µc, we have:
Definition 6.1. A Restricted Range Model (RRM) is a NL Model with P and
its conjugate P given by, ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω},
P (A) = bP0(A) + a, (26)
P (A) = bP0(A) + c, (27)
with a, b satisfying (25), c given by (9), and P (∅) = P (∅) = 0, P (Ω) = P (Ω) =
1.
The consistency properties of a RRM are easy to fix:
Proposition 6.1. Let (P , P ) be a RRM. Then P , P are 2-coherent, and coher-
ent iff |P| = 2.
Thus, a RRM is 2-coherent, but typically not coherent. Proposition 6.1 lets
us deduce also the following interesting result.
Proposition 6.2. In a NL model, if P (P ) is coherent, then it is 2-monotone
(2-alternating).
To clarify which beliefs may be supported by a RRM, we state its following
elementary properties:
Proposition 6.3. Let (P , P ) be a RRM, A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω}. Then, concerning
P ,
k) P (A) > P0(A) iff P0(A) <
a
1−b ;
kk) P (A) ∈ [a, a+ b].
As for P ,
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k′) P (A) < P0(A) iff P0(A) > c1−b ;
kk′) P (A) ∈ [c, b+ c] = [1− (a+ b), 1− a].
Properties kk), kk′) justify the name Restricted Range Model: the values
of P , P on non-trivial events belong to proper subsets of the interval [0, 1],
distinct unless P = P , but both having the same width b. Thus b measures
the range of the admissible P - and P -evaluations for any non-trivial event.
Now take P , whose plot against P0 is illustrated in Figure 3, 1). By property
Figure 3: Plots of P , P against P0 in the RRM. P and P are dashed bold in their
prudential part, continuous bold elsewhere. 1) P against P0. 2) Its conjugate
P against P0.
k), the evaluation of a P -assessor is imprudent for low probability events (low
meaning P0 <
a
1−b ), prudential otherwise. Interpreting again P0(A) as the ‘true’
probability for event A, the P -assessor overestimates low probability events,
while underestimates high probability event, which s/he buys for no more than
a+ b < 1. Here a measures the assessor’s imprudence: her/his buying price for
any non-impossible event is at least a.
So far, the RRM looks very similar to the HBM, as both can represent an
assessor’s conflicting attitudes. At a closer look, a difference is that the P -
assessor is imprudent with high probability events, using the HBM, with low
probability events, by the RRM. Further, in the prudential area, the agent is
more cautious with the HBM: there are events (those A such that P0(A) <
−ab ) which s/he does not buy, unless they are given away for nothing. On the
contrary, in the RRM the assessor is willing to buy any event paying at least a.
The opposite holds in the imprudent area.
Probabilities play a negligible role within RRMs: as a consequence of Propo-
sition 6.1, P = P = P is a probability iff |P| = 2.
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In the whole, we may say that the RRM is the least consistent among the
NL models, and (correspondingly) the one which deviates more from the PMM.
6.2 Degenerate NL models
Define µh as µh(A) = a ∈ [0, 1], ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω}, and µh(∅) = 0, µh(Ω) = 1.
This is a special Hurwicz capacity, following [2].
So far, we supposed b > 0 in Definition 3.2 of a NL model; this assumption
has been useful in previous computations, to prevent dividing by zero. However,
allowing b = 0, the Hurwicz capacity µh can be formally computed by Equation
(8), as well as its conjugate µch given by µ
c
h(A) = 1− a, ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω}.
Thinking of the couple (µh, µ
c
h), we term a the smaller between µh(A),
µch(A), i.e., with the notation used so far, a ≤ 1− a. Consequently, µh ≤ µch, so
µh (µ
c
h) is a lower (upper) probability. Summing up:
Definition 6.2. A Degenerate NL Model is a couple (Ph, Ph), with Ph NL(a, 0),
Ph NL(1− a, 0), a ∈ [0, 12 ].
Despite its simplicity, a degenerate NL model may be compatible with dif-
ferent degrees of consistency, as the following proposition points out referring
to Ph (conjugacy ensures the same properties for Ph).
Proposition 6.4. Let (Ph, Ph) be a degenerate NL model.
(a) Ph : A(P)→ R is 2-coherent.
(b) The restriction of Ph on A(P) \ {∅,Ω} is convex.
(c) If P is finite, P = {ω1, . . . , ωn}, Ph is C-convex on A(P) iff a ≤ 1n iff Ph
avoids sure loss on A(P).
Behaviourally, Ph expresses willingness to buy any non-trivial event in A(P)
at the same price. If a = 0, Ph coincides with the vacuous lower probability
and is coherent. In general, Ph is not coherent: already its restriction on P is
incoherent, if P is infinite and a > 0.
Still referring to the restriction of Ph on P, note that it expresses a sym-
metry judgement over the atoms of P. With coherence, this may be acceptable
for a > 0 only if P is finite, and then with the constraint a ≤ 1|P| . With precise
probabilities, it is even required that a = 1|P| ; this corresponds to the uniform
probability. By Proposition 6.4, 2-coherence and convexity are instead compat-
ible with a symmetry or indifference judgement on even larger sets: the whole
A(P) with 2-coherence, A(P) \ {∅,Ω} with convexity, again A(P), but only if P
is finite, assuming C-convexity (or equivalently the condition of avoiding sure
loss).
Remark 6.1. In general, neither between 2-coherence and convexity implies the
other one, while a lower prevision defined on a real vector space of gambles is 2-
coherent and convex if and only if it is coherent [15, Proposition 13]. The results
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in this section show that this equivalence is not general. In fact, a Hurwicz
capacity Ph defined on P (or also on A(P) \ {∅,Ω}) is both 2-coherent and
convex, by Proposition 6.4 (a), (b), but not coherent if a > 0 and P is infinite.
7 Comparisons with Other Models
In this section we compare NL models with other models proposed in the litera-
ture that are to a certain extent overlapping with them. Prior to this, we discuss
in the next subsection how the properties of the sets Nµ,Uµ of, respectively, null
and universal events for a measure µ may vary with the degree of consistency
required to µ. The topic is of interest in itself, although our primary aim is
to exploit it while comparing NL models and neo-additive capacities in Section
7.2.
7.1 Null and universal events with different consistency
notions
Let µ be an uncertainty measure on A(P). Recall that a set of events F ⊂ A(P)
is a filter if:
Ω ∈ F , ∅ /∈ F ; A,B ∈ F ⇒ A ∧B ∈ F ; if A ∈ F , A⇒ B then B ∈ F .
A set of events I ⊂ A(P) is an ideal if:
∅ ∈ I, Ω /∈ I; A,B ∈ I ⇒ A ∨B ∈ I; if A ∈ I, B ⇒ A then B ∈ I.
When µ = P , a probability, it is well-known that:
i) UP is a filter, while NP is an ideal.
ii) A ∈ UP iff ¬A ∈ NP .
When µ is an imprecise probability, these properties are only partly retained,
and the way µ deviates from them depends on its exact type of consistency. We
present significant cases for lower probabilities in the next result.
Proposition 7.1. Let P : A(P)→ R be a lower probability.
(a) If P is coherent, then UP is a filter, but NP may not be an ideal. Further,
it holds that
A ∈ UP ⇒ ¬A ∈ NP . (28)
(b) If P is 2-coherent, UP may not be a filter: in particular, it is possible that
P (A) = P (B) = 1, A ∧B 6= ∅, but P (A ∧B) = 0. Equation (28) holds.
(c) If P is convex, UP may not be a filter, but if P (A) = P (B) = 1, A∧B 6= ∅,
then P (A∧B) ≥ 12 (the bound is tight). Equation (28) does not necessarily
hold; it does if P is C-convex.
We may conclude that, in particular, condition A ∈ Uµ ⇔ ¬A ∈ Nµ cannot
be expected to hold with imprecise probabilities, while its weakened form (28)
does for several common consistency requirements.
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7.2 NL models and other capacities
Since P , P in any NL model are (also) capacities, NL models overlap to some
extent with certain models exploiting specific capacities for various purposes.
To the best of our knowledge, the oldest reference of this kind is a paper
by Rieder [18] focused on statistical robustness. In [18], Rieder introduces a
specific VBM and proves the 2-monotonicity of its P . His model is a special
case of ours, since he requires (using our parametrisation) the extra condition
a ≥ −1.
The comparison is more complex with neo-additive capacities (NACs)5 in-
troduced in [2], and Generalised neo-additive capacities (GNACs) introduced in
[7]. These types of capacities, originally devised within utility theory, were also
studied and characterised in an abstract measure setting in [9]. In these papers,
a probability P0 is given, and the capacity µ is a linear affine transformation of
P0 on the set E of essential events, i.e., µ(A) = bP0(A) + a, ∀A ∈ E . However,
with NL models we derive the sets Nµ,Uµ a posteriori, after defining µ by (8)
and using (10), (11), while Eµ is the difference A(P)\ (Nµ∪Uµ). By contrast, in
this approach a set N of events which must have µ-measure 0 is fixed a priori,
requiring further that N is an ideal and that
A ∈ U ⇔ ¬A ∈ N . (29)
Then µ is defined on A(P) by:
µ(A) =

0 if A ∈ N
bP0(A) + a if A ∈ E def= A(P) \ (N ∪ U)
1 if A ∈ U
. (30)
Thus, N does not necessarily coincide with what we defined as Nµ: there may
be A ∈ E having µ(A) = 0 (if bP0(A) + a = 0).
Unlike NL models, neo-additive capacities require that a, b ∈ [0, 1],6 0 ≤
bP0(A) + a ≤ 1 ∀A ∈ E , and that NP0 ⊃ N . GNACs require b ≥ 0, a ∈ R as
in the NL models, but with the additional condition that P is finite. Also, the
set N still has to be an ideal, and might be determined on the basis of utility
theory considerations.
In general, the sets NP ,NP in the NL models cannot be taken as N : they are
typically not ideals, whileNP ,UP may not satisfy (29). For them the implication
(28) holds instead under coherence or 2-coherence, as we have seen in Section
7.1. Nor can E be identified with EP or EP : it is possible in (30) that A ∈ E
and µ(A) = 0 or µ(A) = 1. Note also that, if one wishes for whatever reason to
impose that certain events belong to N , then most NL models are unfit for this
purpose. For instance, take PPMM: here UPPMM = {Ω}, hence to satisfy (29)
and (30) it is necessary that N = {∅}. Similarly with the RRM.
There are further differences with NL models:
5Neo-additive is the acronym for Non-Extreme Outcomes additive.
6This is seen after a relabelling in [2, Definition 3.2], originally defining NACs as a mixture
of P0 and a Hurwicz capacity.
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- It is not distinguished whether any µ is a lower or an upper probability.
- The consistency properties of NACs and GNACs (coherence, 2-coherence)
are not investigated, even though some special cases of GNACs are studied
in [7]. 2-monotone or 2-alternating capacities (termed convex or concave,
respectively) are especially considered.
An analogy lies instead in the motivations for introducing these models,
which are to represent coexistence of both optimism and pessimism towards
uncertainty or ambiguity. This is closed to the interpretation in terms of the
assessor’s prudential or non-prudential attitude in NL models.
7.3 NL models and probability intervals
Given a finite partition P = {ω1, . . . , ωn}, a probability interval I = (l, u) on P
is an n-tuple of intervals [li, ui], 0 ≤ li ≤ ui ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n [4].
It may be viewed
i) as a lower and upper probability assignment on P, or equivalently
ii) as a lower probability assignment on P ∪ {Ai : ¬Ai ∈ P}, where, for
i = 1, . . . , n, P (ωi) = li, P (Ai) = 1− P (¬Ai) = 1− ui if ¬Ai = ωi.
It is well-known [1, 12, 4] that a probability interval I is coherent (reachable in
the terminology of [4]) on P iff
ui +
∑
j 6=i
lj ≤ 1, li +
∑
j 6=i
uj ≥ 1, i = 1, . . . , n,
and that if I is coherent on P it has a least-committal extension (or natural
extension [20]) on A(P) given by, ∀A ∈ A(P),
l(A) = max
{ ∑
ωi⇒A
li, 1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
ui
}
, (31)
u(A) = 1− l(¬A) = min
{ ∑
ωi⇒A
ui, 1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
li
}
. (32)
Moreover, l(·) (u(·)) is coherent and 2-monotone (2-alternating) on A(P). Least-
committal means that if P is any coherent extension of I on A(P) and P is its
conjugate, then ∀A ∈ A(P)
(0 ≤) l(A) ≤ P (A) ≤ P (A) ≤ u(A) (≤ 1). (33)
For a better understanding, we call extended probability interval, IE , the least-
committal extension (31), (32) on A(P) of a coherent I.
A reason for comparing NL models and probability intervals is that, as has
recently been proven [12], any PMM in a finite setting is an extended probability
28
interval. It is therefore of interest to establish whether this property holds for
more general NL models.
We start with VBMs. It appears already from the following result that they
are usually not extended probability intervals.
Proposition 7.2. Let (P , P ) be a VBM on A(P) (Definition 4.1), |P| = n, and
define I = (P |P, P |P). Then (P , P ) is the extended probability interval IE of I
if and only if one of the following holds:
(a) a = 0,
(b) a+ b = 1,
(c) ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω}, A satisfies one of the following conditions (the condi-
tion may vary with A):
(c1) P (A) = 0,
(c2) a < 0, P (A) > 0, A = ω+ ∨
k∨
j=1
ωij , k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, P (ω+) > 0,
P0(ωij ) = 0, j = 1, . . . , k,
(c3) P (A) > 0 and ¬A ∈ P.
We may restate Proposition 7.2 in a more expressive way, on the grounds of
the following considerations.
Its conditions (a) and (b) require, respectively, that (P , P ) is an ε-contami-
nation model or a Pari-Mutuel model.
As for condition (c), it is easy to realise that it is always satisfied when
|P| = n ≤ 3.
When n > 3, (c) can only hold if
|P+| = |{ω ∈ P : P (ω) > 0}| ≤ 1. (34)
In fact, suppose that (c) holds, let P (ω+) > 0, and take any ω 6= ω+. Then
P (ω) = 0, or else A = ω+ ∨ ω satisfies none of the subcriteria (c1), (c2), (c3).
Since ω is arbitrary in P \ {ω+}, (34) holds.
Let us see in detail the two possible situations compatible with (34).
• |P+| = 1. Then ∃! ω+ : P (ω+) > 0. Taking any ω 6= ω+, the event
A = ω+ ∨ ω can only satisfy (c2), but this requires P0(ω) = 0. Thus P0
must be concentrated in ω+ (P0(ω
+) = 1), which is on the other hand
also sufficient for (c).
In fact, since P0 ≥ P , it must be P (A) = 0 for any A such that ω+∧A = ∅.
Therefore, if ω+∧A = ∅, A satisfies (c1), while if ω+∧A = ω+, A satisfies
(c2) (if ω ⇒ A, ω 6= ω+, P (ω) = P0(ω) = 0).
• |P+| = 0. Then, (c2) does not apply. To satisfy (c), either P is the
vacuous lower probability, or those events A with P (A) > 0 are made of
n− 1 atoms of P.
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Summarising, we have
Proposition 7.3. Let (P , P ) be a VBM on A(P). (P , P ) is the extended prob-
ability interval of its restriction on P iff one of the following holds:
(a) (P , P ) is an ε-contamination model,
(b) (P , P ) is a PMM,
(c) |P| ≤ 3,
(d) |P| > 3 and one the following holds:
• P0 is concentrated on one atom of P,
• (P , P ) is the vacuous imprecise probability,
• if P (A) > 0 then A is made of n− 1 atoms.
Turning to the other NL models, there is little to say about RRMs: they
are extended probability intervals iff |P| = 2. As for HBMs, when they are
coherent (which, as seen in Section 5.2, is not the rule), they are also extended
probability intervals:
Proposition 7.4. If in a HBM, P and P are coherent on A(P), |P| = n, then
(P , P ) is the extended probability interval of I = (P |P, P |P).
We conclude that NL models are extended probability intervals in very spe-
cial instances only.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced Nearly-Linear models, investigating the consis-
tency properties of their subfamilies and the beliefs they can represent. We have
shown that they may range from coherent models (even precise probabilities, in
very special instances) to 2-coherent ones, and that they can represent more or
less rational ways of assessing uncertainty evaluations. The least rational beliefs
elicit ways of thinking of possibly inexperienced or irrational assessors, but are
not uncommon in practice. Similar attitudes have been observed also in other
areas, like Decision Theory and Behavioural Economics, although models devel-
oped in these realms for these purposes only partly overlap with NL models, as
we have noticed. It is therefore important to clarify which are the connections
between these convictions and the degree of consistency of the model represent-
ing them. In the whole, we find a surprising variety of situations. At one end,
the VBM is a cautious generalisation of the PMM; it is a sound model, as it is
coherent and corrects a possible practical shortcoming of the PMM, its neglect-
ing fixed costs in the making of a selling price of an event. At the other end,
the HBM and the RRM both convey a subject’s conflicting attitudes. These
are especially patent with tail events: the P , P evaluations of high (low) P0
probability events are even higher (lower) in the HBM, while they move in the
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opposite way in the RRM, flattening the P , P values of all non-trivial events in a
range narrower than 1. This latter behaviour is less consistent than the former:
RRMs are 2-coherent, but not coherent (unless |P| = 2), whilst a HBM may
be coherent in some specific circumstances. Both a HBM and a RRM should
therefore be regarded as simple ways of explaining certain behaviours, rather
than ideal models for assessing uncertainty.
The major open question regarding NL models is how to make inferences, or
conditioning, with them. In the case of the VBM, we deem likely that the results
obtained for the PMM in [17] can be generalised. Extending the remaining
2-coherent models may be more complex, even though some results for the 2-
coherent natural extension in [15] could be applied.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Recalling Definition 2.1, only monotonicity has to be
checked. Take for this A,B ∈ A(P), A⇒ B, and let µ be defined by (8). Hence
µ(·) ∈ [0, 1], and, if µ(A) = 0, it is obviously µ(A) ≤ µ(B). If µ(A) > 0, using
(8), b > 0 and monotonicity of P0, we obtain
µ(A) = min{bP0(A) + a, 1} ≤ min{bP0(B) + a, 1} = µ(B).

Proof of Proposition 3.1. µc(A) satisfies Definition 3.1 for A = ∅, A = Ω.
For any A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω}, we have by (8)
µc(A) = 1− µ(¬A) = 1−min{max{bP0(¬A) + a, 0}, 1}
= 1 + max{−max{b(1− P0(A)) + a, 0},−1}
= 1 + max{min{bP0(A)− (a+ b), 0},−1}
= max{min{bP0(A)− (a+ b), 0}+ 1, 0}
= max{min{bP0(A) + 1− (a+ b), 1}, 0}.
From the second equality in (8) and the last expression, we derive that µc is
NL(1− (a+ b), b), which is the thesis.

Proof of Proposition 3.2. Since A(P) is negation-invariant, we may apply
Proposition 2.1. Taking account of Lemma 3.1, there remains to check that,
∀A ∈ A(P), P (A) + P (¬A) ≤ 1. (35)
We distinguish the following, exhaustive cases:
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(a) If A ∈ NP , then P (A) + P (¬A) = P (¬A) ≤ 1.
(b) If A ∈ UP , then ¬A ∈ NP . This is trivially true if A = Ω. Otherwise,
A ∈ UP implies bP0(A) + a ≥ 1, equivalent to b(1− P0(¬A)) + a ≥ 1 and
to bP0(¬A) + a ≤ b+ 2a− 1 ≤ 0, using (13) at the last inequality. Hence
¬A ∈ NP and (35) holds by (a).
(c) If A ∈ EP , then ¬A /∈ UP (by (b): ¬A ∈ UP would imply A ∈ NP ). If
¬A ∈ NP , we obtain case (a); if ¬A ∈ EP ,
P (A) + P (¬A) = bP0(A) + a+ bP0(¬A) + a = b+ 2a ≤ 1.

Proof of Proposition 3.4.
(a) If b+ 2a = 1, then c = 1− (a+ b) = a. Hence, P and P are both NL(a, b),
so P = P , applying Definition 3.2.
(b) Consider any event A ∈ A(P). Since P = P = P , we obtain from (2)
P (A) + P (¬A) = 1. (36)
It is then not possible that both A and ¬A belong to EP : otherwise, by
(36), we would get bP0(A) + a = P (A) = 1−P (¬A) = 1− (bP0(¬A) + a),
equivalent to b + 2a = 1, against the assumption. Hence, at least one
between A or ¬A belongs to NP ∪UP , and its probability P (A) is either 0
or 1. But then the probability of its negation is either 1 or 0, respectively,
by (36). Thus EP = ∅.

Proof of Proposition 4.1. It is sufficient to prove the thesis for P . For this,
we prove first that P is 2-monotone, i.e., that Equation (6) holds for P . Observe
for this that:
• Equation (6) holds trivially either when at least one between events A and
B is Ω, or when P (A) · P (B) = 0 (implying by monotonicity of P that
P (A ∧B) = 0, P (A ∨B) ≥ max{P (A), P (B)}).
• Suppose then A 6= Ω, B 6= Ω, P (A)·P (B) > 0. Equation (6) holds, because
P (A) + P (B) = bP0(A) + a+ bP0(B) + a
= bP0(A ∨B) + a+ bP0(A ∧B) + a
≤ P (A ∨B) + max{bP0(A ∧B) + a, 0}
= P (A ∨B) + P (A ∧B).
Hence, P is 2-monotone, and P (∅) = 0, P (Ω) = 1. Therefore P is coherent [19,
Corollary 6.16].
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
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Proof of (a). (⇒) If A = ∅, the equality is
true for k = 0. Otherwise, A =
∨
ω⇒A,ω∈P
ω, and, for any such ω implying A,
P (ω) ≤ P (A) = 0 by monotonicity of P , hence P (ω) = 0.
(⇐) Let A =
k∨
i=1
ωji , with ωji ∈ NP , i = 1, . . . , k. Using subadditivity of P ,
it is
k∑
i=1
P (ωji) = 0 ≥ P (A) ≥ 0, thus P (A) = 0, i.e., A ∈ NP .
Proof of (b). (⇐) Let A = ω+ ∨
k∨
i=1
ωji , with ω
+ ∈ P ∩ EP , ωji ∈ NP ,
i = 1, . . . , k. Let k > 0 (otherwise the thesis is trivial). It holds that
1 > P (ω+) = P (ω+) +
k∑
i=1
P (ωji) ≥ P (A) ≥ P (ω+) > 0, (37)
using subadditivity of P at the first weak inequality, its monotonicity at the
second. Hence, P (A) = P (ω+) ∈ ]0, 1[, meaning that A ∈ EP .
(⇒) Since A ∈ EP , for any ω ∈ P implying A it is 0 ≤ P (ω) ≤ P (A) < 1.
Thus ω ∈ NP ∪ EP , and A may be decomposed as
A =
∨
ω⇒A,ω∈NP
ω ∨
∨
ω⇒A,ω∈EP
ω. (38)
Applying subadditivity of P ,∑
ω⇒A,ω∈NP
P (ω) +
∑
ω⇒A,ω∈EP
P (ω)
=
∑
ω⇒A,ω∈EP
(
bP0(ω) + c
)
≥ P (A) = bP0(A) + c
= b
( ∑
ω⇒A,ω∈NP
P0(ω) +
∑
ω⇒A,ω∈EP
P0(ω)
)
+ c.
Name m the cardinality of the set {ω ∈ EP ∩ P : ω ⇒ A}. Then, comparing in
the derivation above
∑
ω⇒A,ω∈EP (bP0(ω)+c) with the last row term, we obtain
mc ≥ b
∑
ω⇒A,ω∈NP
P0(ω) + c ≥ c.
Since c < 0, it is either m = 1, P0(ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ NP , ω ⇒ A, or, alternatively,
m = 0. Assuming m = 0, by (38) A =
∨
ω⇒A,ω∈NP ω, and by (a) of this
proposition A ∈ NP , a contradiction. Therefore m = 1, P0(ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ NP ,
ω ⇒ A, which is the thesis.
Proof of (c). Two alternatives may occur:
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i) P ∩ UP 6= ∅. Then there is ω∗ ∈ UP such that bP0(ω∗) + c ≥ 1, and (22)
holds, since bP0(ω
+) + c > 0;
ii) P ∩ UP = ∅. Note that, using subadditivity of P ,
1 = P (Ω) = P
( ∨
ω∈NP
ω ∨
∨
ω∈EP
ω
)
≤
∑
ω∈NP
P (ω) +
∑
ω∈EP
P (ω) =
∑
ω∈EP
(
bP0(ω) + c
)
. (39)
Then, by (39), since bP0(ω
+) + c < 1, there exists ω∗ ∈ P ∩ EP , ω∗ 6= ω+.
Since ω+ ∨ ω∗ /∈ NP (by (a)) and ω+ ∨ ω∗ /∈ EP (by (b)), necessarily
ω+ ∨ ω∗ ∈ UP , which implies (22), together with subadditivity:
bP0(ω
+) + c+ bP0(ω
∗) + c = P (ω+) + P (ω∗) ≥ P (ω+ ∨ ω∗) = 1.

Proof of Corollary 5.1. Event A can be decomposed as in Proposition 5.3
(b). Assuming that decomposition, it is derived from Equation (37) in the proof
of Proposition 5.3 (b) that P (A) = P (ω+).

Proof of Proposition 5.4. Take any two distinct ωi, ωj ∈ EP . By Proposition
5.3, P (ωi ∨ ωj) = 1, implying that
b
(
P0(ωi) + P0(ωj)
)
+ c ≥ 1.
It ensues that (c < 0): P0(ωi) + P0(ωj) ≥ 1−cb > 1b , or also (P0(ωi)P0(ωj) > 0
from (21))
b >
1
P0(ωi) + P0(ωj)
, (40)
which justifies the internal maximum in Equation (23).
To complete the proof, since |P| ≥ 2m and assuming for notational simplicity
that the first 2m elements of P ∩ EP are ω1, . . . , ω2m, we have
1 = P0(Ω) ≥
m∑
i=1
(
P0(ω2i−1) + P0(ω2i)
)
>
m
b
,
applying the reciprocal of (40) at the strict inequality. The inequality b > m
follows.

Proof of Proposition 5.5. We distinguish two cases:
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1) Let P be finite.
If P is coherent, it is necessarily subadditive (cf. (3)).
Conversely, suppose that P is subadditive. By Theorem 2.1 (b), P is
coherent if we prove that
∀A ∈ A(P), ∃PA : PA(A) = P (A), PA(B) ≤ P (B), ∀B ∈ A(P),
with PA : A(P)→ R precise probability. We distinguish three exhaustive
alternatives. Prior to this, define the function
δ(ω ⇒ B) =
{
1 if ω ⇒ B
0 if ω 6⇒ B
(a) A ∈ EP .
Define PA(ω) on P as follows:
PA(ω) =

bP0(ω
+) + c if ω = ω+
1− PA(ω+) if ω = ω∗
0 otherwise
where ω∗, ω+ are the atoms in Proposition 5.3 (b) and (c). Then
extend PA on A(P) putting, ∀B ∈ A(P),
PA(B) = δ(ω
+ ⇒ B)PA(ω+) + δ(ω∗ ⇒ B)PA(ω∗). (41)
Clearly, PA is a probability on A(P). Let us see that, ∀B ∈ A(P),
PA(B) ≤ P (B):
i) if B ∈ UP , then PA(B) ≤ 1 = P (B);
ii) if B ∈ NP , then ω+ 6⇒ B, ω∗ 6⇒ B, by Proposition 5.3 (a). From
Equation (41), PA(B) = 0 = P (B);
iii) if B ∈ EP , by Corollary 5.1 there is one and only one ωB ∈ P∩EP
such that P (B) = P (ωB).
If ωB = ω
+, or ωB = ω
∗, then by (41) PA(B) = PA(ω+) = P (B),
or PA(B) = PA(ω
∗) = P (B), respectively.
If ωB 6= ω+, ωB 6= ω∗, by (41) PA(B) = 0 < P (B).
Hence PA(B) ≤ P (B) in any case, and, when B = A, PA(A) = P (A):
B = A is included into the subcase ωB = ω
+ of iii) above.
(b) A ∈ UP .
By Proposition 5.3, two alternatives may occur:
j) ∃ω(1) ∈ UP : ω(1) ⇒ A.
Define
PA(B) = δ
(
ω(1) ⇒ B), ∀B ∈ A(P).
Since ω(1) 6⇒ B if either B ∈ NP (Proposition 5.3 (a)) or B ∈ EP
(Proposition 5.3 (b)), PA(B) = 0 ≤ P (B) for B ∈ NP ∪ EP . If
B ∈ UP , PA(B) ≤ 1 = P (B). Hence it is always PA ≤ P , and in
particular PA(A) = 1 = P (A).
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jj) ∃ω′, ω′′ ∈ EP : ω′ ⇒ A,ω′′ ⇒ A,ω′ 6= ω′′.
Define the following probability:
PA(ω) =

bP0(ω
′) + c if ω = ω′
1− PA(ω′) if ω = ω′′
0 if ω /∈ {ω′, ω′′}
PA(B) = δ(ω
′ ⇒ B)PA(ω′) + δ(ω′′ ⇒ B)PA(ω′′), ∀B ∈ A(P).
(42)
To prove that PA(B) ≤ P (B), ∀B ∈ A(P), note that if B ∈ UP
or B ∈ NP , the argument parallels that of i), ii), respectively,
item (a).
There remains the case B ∈ EP , where, by Proposition 5.3 (b),
B = ω+ ∨
k∨
i=1
ωji , ω
+ ∈ P ∩ EP , ωji ∈ NP , P0(ωji) = 0, i =
1, . . . , k. Three subcases may occur (use (42) to compute PA):
• if ω+ 6= ω′, ω+ 6= ω′′, then PA(B) = 0 < P (B);
• if ω+ = ω′, then PA(B) = bP0(ω′)+c = bP0(ω+)+c = P (B),
with the last equality arising from Corollary 5.1;
• If ω+ = ω′′, by Proposition 5.3 (b) ω′ ∨ ω′′ ∈ UP . This fact
and subadditivity imply that
bP0(ω
′)+c+bP0(ω′′)+c = P (ω′)+P (ω′′) ≥ P (ω′∨ω′′) = 1.
From the inequality above and Corollary 5.1,
PA(B) = PA(ω
′′) = 1− PA(ω′)
= 1− (bP0(ω′) + c) ≤ bP0(ω′′) + c = P (B).
Finally, PA(A) = PA(ω
′) + PA(ω′′) = 1 = P (A).
(c) A ∈ NP .
For any A ∈ UP ∪ EP ⊃ {Ω}, the corresponding PA obtained in (a)
and (b) is equal to 0 = P (B), ∀B ∈ NP . Thus, no further PA has to
be added for A ∈ NP : P is the upper envelope of the probabilities
obtained in the previous two steps.
2) Let P be infinite.
To prove coherence of P , we have to ensure that for the generic gain G in
Definition 2.3 it holds that maxG ≥ 0.
If we consider the finite partition PG generated by Ai, i = 0, 1, . . . , n (cf.
Section 2.1), we note that the gamble G is defined on PG, and that, for i =
0, 1, . . . , n, Ai ∈ A(PG), which is finite too. Therefore G is also obtained
from checking coherence of the restriction of P on A(PG), P |A(PG). But
since P |A(PG)(A∨B) ≤ P |A(PG)(A)+P |A(PG)(B), ∀A,B ∈ A(PG), P |A(PG)
is coherent by Part 1), hence maxG ≥ 0. Since the argument applies to
any generic gain concerning P , P is coherent too.
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Proof of Proposition 5.7. We prove (4) in all cases but the symmetric ones,
obtained exchanging A and B. Let then A,B ∈ A(P) with A ∧B = ∅.
• If A ∈ NP , (4) boils down to P (A ∨ B) ≥ P (B), true by monotonicity of
P .
• If A,B ∈ EP , P (A) + P (B) = bP0(A) + bP0(B) + 2a = bP0(A ∨ B) + 2a.
Given this,
if A ∨ B ∈ EP , P (A) + P (B) = P (A ∨ B) + a < P (A ∨ B) (using
(19));
if A ∨B ∈ UP , P (A) + P (B) ≤ b+ 2a ≤ 1 = P (A ∨B) (using (18)).
• It cannot occur that A ∈ EP ∪ UP , B ∈ UP : since A ⇒ ¬B, this would
imply 1 < P (A) + 1 ≤ P (¬B) + P (B), which conflicts with Proposition
2.1 (ii).

Proof of Proposition 5.9. It suffices by conjugacy to prove that P is 2-
alternating, checking (7). Given E ∈ A(P), define
PE = {ω ∈ P : ω ⇒ E,P (ω) > 0}.
Recall from Proposition 5.3 (b) and Corollary 5.1 that P (E) = 1 if |PE | ≥ 2.
Now let P be coherent, take any two A,B ∈ A(P), and consider PA∨B . The
following alternatives may occur:
(a) |PA∨B | = 0. Then (7) trivially holds, in the form 0 = 0.
(b) |PA∨B | ≥ 1 and |PA∧B | = 0. Then P (A ∧ B) = 0, and (7) boils down to
P (A ∨B) ≤ P (A) + P (B), true by subadditivity of P .
(c) Either |PA∨B | = |PA∧B | = 1, or |PA∨B | ≥ 2 and at least 2 atoms in
PA∨B imply A ∧B.
Then all the upper probabilities are identical in (7), which holds with
equality.
(d) |PA∨B | ≥ 2 and exactly one ω ∈ PA∨B implies A ∧B.
Then P (A ∨B) = 1, and the following subcases arise:
- All atoms in PA∨B \ {ω}(6= ∅) imply A ∧ ¬B. Then P (A) = 1 and
(7) reduces to P (B)− P (A ∧B) ≥ 0, true by monotonicity of P .
- All atoms in PA∨B\{ω} imply ¬A∧B: analogous argument as above.
- In PA∨B \{ω}, at least one atom implies A∧¬B, and at least another
one implies ¬A ∧ B. Then P (A) = 1 = P (B), and (7) becomes the
true inequality P (A ∧B) ≤ 1.
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Proof of Proposition 5.10. Suppose first that P = P = P , P probability
(P 6= P0). Two alternatives are possible:
(i) ∃ω+ ∈ P : P (ω+) = 1.
Then clearly, since P is a probability, P (ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ P \ {ω+}.
(ii) ∀ω ∈ P, P (ω) < 1.
Then EP ∩ P 6= ∅ (since
∑
ω∈P P (ω) = 1).
Take ω∗ ∈ EP ∩ P: from P (ω∗) = bP0(ω∗) + a = P (ω∗) = bP0(ω∗) + c we
immediately obtain a = c (c < 0, since P 6= P0).
It is not possible that |EP ∩ P| ≥ 3: if, say, ω1, ω2, ω3 ∈ EP ∩ P, then
P (ω1∨ω2) = 1, by Proposition 5.3 (b) (thinking of P as a coherent, hence
monotone and subadditive, upper probability). This implies P (ω3) = 0,
contradicting ω3 ∈ EP .
Since P is finite, it is also |EP ∩ P| 6= 1. Thus |EP ∩ P| = 2.
Conversely, assume now that either (a) or (b) hold.
If (a) holds, P = P = P is trivially a probability.
If (b) holds, a = c (that is, b+2a = 1) ensures that P = P = P (Proposition
3.4 (a)). P is a probability, by Lemma 2.1 (cf. also Remark 2.1).

Proof of Proposition 5.11. If P = P = P is a probability measure, then since
P is coherent as both a lower and an upper probability, (a) and (b) necessarily
hold (cf. Equations (3), (5)).
Conversely, let (a), (b) hold. Then, ∀S ∈ A(P), it is
1 = P (Ω) = P (S ∨ ¬S) ≤ P (S) + P (¬S) ≤ 1 + P (S ∧ ¬S) = 1,
implying that P (S) = 1 − P (¬S) = P (S). Thus P = P = P . Moreover, P , P
are coherent lower, respectively upper, probabilities, from Propositions 5.5, 5.6.
Therefore, P is a probability (Lemma 2.1 and Remark 2.1).

Proof of Proposition 6.1. It suffices to consider P . P is 2-coherent by (25)
and Proposition 3.2.
P is not coherent if |P| ≥ 3. In fact, then there are distinct ω1, ω2 ∈ P, such
that ω1 ∨ ω2 6= Ω. By (26), (25):
P (ω1) + P (ω2) = b
(
P0(ω1) + P0(ω2)
)
+ 2a
= bP0(ω1 ∨ ω2) + 2a = P (ω1 ∨ ω2) + a > P (ω1 ∨ ω2).
Hence P is incoherent, being not superadditive (cf. (4)).
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P is coherent, if |P| = 2. In fact, then P = {ω,¬ω} and, by (26), (25):
P (ω) + P (¬ω) = b(P0(ω) + P0(¬ω))+ 2a = b+ 2a ≤ 1 = P (Ω).
From this inequality, P is coherent onA(P), being the lower envelope of {P1, P2},
with P1(ω) = P (ω), P1(¬ω) = 1 − P (ω), P2(ω) = 1 − P (¬ω), P2(¬ω)
= P (¬ω).

Proof of Proposition 6.2. Follows from: Proposition 6.1, recalling that any
coherent P (P ) on A(P) is 2-monotone (2-alternating) if |P| ≤ 3 [19, Proposition
6.9], Proposition 4.1, Proposition 5.9.

Proof of Proposition 6.4.
(a) It is simple to verify that Ph obeys the conditions (i), (ii), (iii) in Propo-
sition 2.1, hence it is 2-coherent.
(b) We prove that Definition 2.2 (b) applies to Ph|A(P)\{∅,Ω}. Considering a
generic GC , recalling that
∑n
i=1 si = 1 there,
GC =
n∑
i=1
si
(
IAi − a
)− (IA0 − a) = n∑
i=1
si IAi − IA0 ,
there is ω∗ ∈ P such that ω∗ ∧ A0 = ∅ (since A0 cannot be Ω). It follows
that
maxGC ≥ GC(ω∗) =
n∑
i=1
si IAi(ω
∗)− IA0(ω∗) =
n∑
i=1
si IAi(ω
∗) ≥ 0.
(c) We prove (c) by means of the following chain of implications: if P is finite,
Ph is C-convex⇒ Ph avoids sure loss⇒ a ≤ 1n ⇒ Ph is C-convex.
In fact, the first implication is a property of C-convex probabilities [14].
To prove the second implication, let Ph avoid sure loss. Applying Defini-
tion 2.2 (c), it must hold that
maxGASL = max
n∑
i=1
1
n
(Iωi − a) ≥ 0.
Since, ∀ωi ∈ P, GASL(ωi) = 1n (1−a)+n−1n (−a) = 1n−a, it is maxGASL ≥ 0
iff a ≤ 1n .
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For the third implication, let a ≤ 1n . We prove that P is convex applying
Theorem 2.1 (c), with M = {P0, P1, . . . , Pn} and α : M → R defined as
follows: ∀i, j = 1, . . . , n,
P0(ωi) =
1
n
, α0 = α(P0) = 0,
Pi(ωj) =
{
1 if ωj = ωi
0 if ωj 6= ωi
, αi = α(Pi) = a.
In fact, it holds that
Ph(A) = min{P0(A), P1(A) + α1, . . . , Pn(A) + αn}, ∀A ∈ A(P). (43)
To see this, note that, for i = 1, . . . , n and for all A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω}, we
have
Pi(A) + αi = 1 + a > a = Ph(A) if ωi ⇒ A,
Pi(A) + αi = a = Ph(A) if ωi ⇒ ¬A,
while for A = ∅, i = 1, . . . , n,
Pi(∅) + αi = a > 0, P0(∅) + α0 = 0 = Ph(∅),
and for A = Ω, i = 1, . . . , n,
Pi(Ω) + αi = 1 + a > 1, P0(Ω) + α0 = 1 = Ph(Ω).
Lastly, we have ∀A ∈ A(P) \ {∅,Ω},
P0(A) ≥ P0(ω¯) = 1
n
≥ a = Ph(A),
where ω¯ ∈ P, ω¯ ⇒ A.
Thus, any of P0, Pi +αi, i = 1, . . . , n, is not smaller than Ph at any event
A, with equality achieved by P0 if A = ∅, A = Ω, by a convenient Pi + αi
(such that ωi ⇒ ¬A) otherwise. This means that (43) holds, and that Ph
is convex. Since Ph(∅) = 0, it is also C-convex.

Proof of Proposition 7.1.
(a) The proof that UP is a filter is given in [20, Section 2.9.8] with reference
to a 0-1 valued lower probability, but applies without modifications to a
generic coherent P . NP is generally not an ideal, since P (A) = P (B) = 0
does not imply P (A ∨B) = 0.
Equation (28) holds, as a consequence of P (A) + P (¬A) ≤ 1 and of non-
negativity of P , both necessary conditions for 2-coherence, hence for co-
herence.
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(b) It may be checked, by inspecting all admissible gains in Definition 2.2 (d),
that the assignment P (A) = P (B) = 1, P (A∧B) = 1−ε, is 2-coherent on
D = {A,B,A ∧B} ⊂ A(P), ∀ε ∈ [0, 1]. Whatever ε is chosen, P admits a
2-coherent extension on A(P) [15]. In particular this holds for ε = 1, i.e.,
P (A ∧B) = 0. Equation (28) holds for the reasons elicited in (a).
(c) To show that P (A) = P (B) = 1 implies P (A ∧B) ≥ 12 (A ∧B 6= ∅), take
P : D → R as in (b) (in particular, P (A∧B) = 1−ε, ε ≥ 0) and the related
following gain G, admissible by Definition 2.2 (b) (where s1 = s2 =
1
2 ):
G = 12
(
IA − 1
)
+ 12
(
IB − 1
)− (IA∧B − (1− ε)) = 12(IA + IB)− IA∧B − ε.
Since G(A∧B) = G(¬A∧¬B) = −ε ≤ 0, G(A∧¬B) = G(¬A∧B) = 12−ε,
when ε > 0 it is maxG ≥ 0 iff ε ≤ 12 . Thus, necessarily, P (A ∧B) ≥ 12 .
The bound P (A ∧ B) = 12 may be achieved, for instance by P in Table
4. P is convex because it is the lower envelope of P1 + α1, P2 + α2, with
α1 = α(P1) = 0, α2 = α(P2) =
1
2 (Theorem 2.1 (c)).
A ∧B ¬A ∧B A ∧ ¬B ¬A ∧ ¬B A B
P1 = P1 + α1 1 0 0 0 1 1
P2 0
1
2
1
2 0
1
2
1
2
P2 + α2
1
2 1 1
1
2 1 1
P 12 0 0 0 1 1
Table 4: A convex lower probability with P (A) = P (B) = 1, P (A ∧B) = 12 .
Finally, (28) may not hold. It does not, for instance, for P ′ = P2 + α2
(which is convex, as a lower envelope of itself) in Table 4: P ′(A∧¬B) = 1,
but P ′(¬(A ∧ ¬B)) = 1.
Equation (28) anyway applies, if P is C-convex. In fact, P then also avoids
sure loss [14, Proposition 3.5 (e)], and as such satisfies P (A)+P (¬A) ≤ 1,
while P is non-negative by C-convexity.

Proof of Proposition 7.2. Obviously, I is coherent, being the restriction of
the coherent (P , P ) on P. Therefore, its extended probability interval IE is
given by (31), (32), with
li = P (ωi), ui = P (ωi), i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that by conjugacy (of both P , P and l, u) it is enough to establish that
P (A) = l(A), ∀A ∈ A(P) (44)
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iff (a), (b) or (c) hold. Equality (44) is certainly true if A = Ω, by coherence of
P , l: P (Ω) = l(Ω) = 1, and, if P (A) = 0, using also (10): P (A) = l(A) = 0.
Therefore, it remains to check when
P (A) = max
{ ∑
ωi⇒A
li, 1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
ui
}
for those events A such that P (A) > 0, A 6= Ω.
Since by (33) l(A) ≤ P (A), this is equivalent to check when P (A) =
∑
ωi⇒A
li
or P (A) = 1 −
∑
ωi⇒¬A
ui. Taking then one such A, we investigate first when
P (A) =
∑
ωi⇒A
li.
Defining
P+A = {ωi ∈ P : ωi ⇒ A,P (ωi) > 0} =
{
ωi ∈ P : ωi ⇒ A,P0(ωi) > −ab
}
,
P0A = {ωi ∈ P : ωi ⇒ A,P (ωi) = 0} =
{
ωi ∈ P : ωi ⇒ A,P0(ωi) ≤ −ab
}
,
observe that, by (15) and letting |P+A | = m,∑
ωi⇒A
li =
∑
ωi∈P0A
P (ωi) +
∑
ωi∈P+A
P (ωi)
=
∑
ωi∈P+A
(
bP0(ωi) + a
)
= ma+ b
∑
ωi∈P+A
P0(ωi).
(45)
Thus, recalling again (15), P (A) =
∑
ωi⇒A
li if and only if
P (A) = bP0(A) + a = b
∑
ωi⇒A
P0(ωi) + a = ma+ b
∑
ωi∈P+A
P0(ωi) =
∑
ωi⇒A
li. (46)
Note that (46) is false when m = 0: in fact, it is P (A) > 0 =
∑
ωi⇒A li.
Thus, the equality (46) holds iff one of the following two cases applies:
• a = 0 (case (a)).
In fact, then P (·) = bP0(·), which implies that P0(ωi) > 0 iff P (ωi) > 0.
Using this fact at the second next equality and (45) at the third,
P (A) = b
∑
ωi⇒A,P0(ωi)>0
P0(ωi) = b
∑
ωi∈P+A
P0(ωi) =
∑
ωi⇒A
li.
• a < 0, A = ω+ ∨
k∨
j=1
ωij , k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, P (ω+) > 0, P0(ωij ) = 0,
j = 1, . . . , k (case (c2)).
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To see this, note that it is
∑
ωi∈P+A
P0(ωi) ≤
∑
ωi⇒A
P0(ωi), and that ma <
a for m ≥ 2, since a < 0. Thus, for a < 0 we need to require m =
1,
∑
ωi∈P+A
P0(ωi) =
∑
ωi⇒A
P0(ωi) for (46) to hold. These conditions can be
equivalently restated in the form of case (c2).
To establish now when P (A) = 1 −
∑
ωi⇒¬A
ui, note first that P (A) > 0 iff
P (¬A) < 1, so that, since here P (A) > 0, we have by (16) that
P (ωi) = bP0(ωi) + c < 1, ∀ωi ∈ P : ωi ⇒ ¬A. (47)
Using (47), we may write
1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
ui = 1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
(
bP0(ωi) + c
)
= 1− rc− b
∑
ωi⇒¬A
P0(ωi), (48)
where r = |{ωi ∈ P : ωi ⇒ ¬A}|.
On the other hand, still using (16), we obtain
P (A) = 1− P (¬A) = 1− c− bP0(¬A) = 1− c− b
∑
ωi⇒¬A
P0(ωi). (49)
Comparing (48) and (49) (recall that c ≥ 0), it is now easy to see that P (A) =
1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
ui if and only if one of the following applies:
• c = 0 (which is case (b), a+ b = 1),
• r = 1, equivalent to ¬A ∈ P (case (c3)).

Proof of Proposition 7.4. I is coherent for the same reasons as at the
beginning of the proof of Proposition 7.2, and (again by conjugacy) it suffices
to prove that
P (A) = u(A), ∀A ∈ A(P),
with u(A) given by (32), ui = P (ωi), li = P (ωi), i = 1, . . . , n.
The following exhaustive alternatives are to be considered:
• P (A) = 1.
From (33) and coherence of P , u, we get P (A) = u(A) = 1.
• P (A) = 0.
If A = ∅, it is P (∅) = u(∅) = 0, by coherence.
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If A 6= ∅, also P (ωi) = 0, ∀ωi ∈ P, ωi ⇒ A. Therefore
∑
ωi⇒A
ui = 0 and
0 ≤ u(A) = min
{
0, 1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
li
}
= 0 = P (A),
thus P (A) = u(A) = 0.
• 0 < P (A) < 1.
Exploiting (33) at the first inequality, Corollary 5.1 at the first equality
(ω+ is such that P (ω+) > 0, ω+ ⇒ A) and Proposition 5.3 (b) at the
second, we obtain:
u(A) ≥ P (A) = P (ω+)
=
∑
ωi⇒A
P (ωi) ≥ min
{ ∑
ωi⇒A
P (ωi), 1−
∑
ωi⇒¬A
li
}
= u(A),
which implies P (A) = u(A).

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